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1.1 Introduction 
 
The pensions system in Ireland  (in common with many other countries) has two main 
elements, - a State - run Social Welfare system and a system of private, voluntary, 
supplementary, pensions provided through a variety of arrangements and regulated by 
a State approved body. The majority of voluntary pension arrangements take the form 
of occupational pension schemes although there is a sizable minority of other individual 
private pension arrangements. Occupational pension schemes are privately managed 
pension schemes offered by employers to some or all employees as part of an overall 
remuneration package. These schemes are funded by contributions from the employer 
and also in many cases the employees.  
 
Ultimately, the objective of any pension arrangement is that it meets its targeted 
pension liabilities as they fall due. Although the assets in which the scheme’s 
contributions have been invested, the investment strategy of the scheme, is an 
important factor in the valuation process and attracts most comment in any discussion 
on pension fund performance, it is not the only determinant of the reported performance 
of occupational pension schemes. The focus of this paper is to demonstrate the impact 
of costs on pension fund performance and the positive impact that efficiencies in costs 
can have on pension fund values and adequacy of cover. 
 
There is an acceptance among some academics (Bateman and Mitchell (2004), Bikker 
and De Dreu (2009)) and some policymakers (UK Pensions Commission (2005), that 
pension costs “over the lifetime of a scheme” can substantially erode retirement assets. 
However in individual scheme cases, this number or a best estimate of this number is 
rarely if ever reported. Indeed as discussed later in this paper, there are inconsistencies 
and in many cases significant under – reporting of costs on an annual basis by pension 
schemes, and this in many ways means that there can be no easy tracking of the 
cumulative effect of costs. While pension scheme costs may or may not be a material 
number affecting the growth in scheme assets in any particular year, this is not 
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necessarily the critical factor. What is critical is the cumulative effect of yearly costs over 
the lifetime of a scheme on the final fund value (ie the long-term rather than the short-
term impact). The lack of focus on the annual effects of costs and as a result, on the 
cumulative effect over the lifetime of a scheme, explains in part at least, why yearly 
costs and cost levels are not a principal target to date in the reform of pension provision 
in Ireland.  
 
Costs faced by Irish pensions schemes may be levied in a variety of ways. This variety 
of charging mechanisms mirrors the pattern of pension fund cost structures elsewhere 
in the world as shown by the Whitehouse (2000) study of pension scheme costs across 
thirteen different countries. Costs may be fixed, charged on a transaction basis or a 
combination of both. They may be explicit or implicit, up-front (i.e. charged in a lump 
sum at the outset) or spread over the lifetime of the scheme. Cost rebates/discounts 
may be agreed depending on transaction volume or size of fund. The pension schemes 
of the larger financial institutions may benefit from cross subsidies where for instance 
the sponsoring company also provides investment management services to its pension 
scheme without charging at full rates or charging on an ad-hoc basis. All of the above 
have the effect of obscuring the cost structure of pension fund management and making 
the task of estimating/forecasting costs of pension fund management and administration 
difficult. 
 
The Irish Government (2007) in its Green Paper on pensions describes explicit charges 
made by third party providers to funded supplementary pension arrangements as 
follows: 
1. Fees, plus VAT charged by the service provider to the arrangement itself and /or to 
the sponsoring entity.  
2. Contract charges which can take a number of forms including a charge on 
contributions, a monetary charge before investment of a contribution or a charge 
expressed as a percentage of the fund.  
Implicit charges are additional to explicit charges. The Green paper includes as implicit 
costs, investment trading costs (e.g. commission and stamp duty) and margins in risk 
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benefit premiums charged by insurers, in relation to anticipated future mortality and 
morbidity rates. 
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows; 
Section 1.2 outlines the data source for this paper. Section 1.3 shows the results of 
quantitative analysis carried out on the data source, which demonstrate the impact of 
cost factors on the valuation of a scheme over its lifetime and the current poor 
disclosure in annual reports to scheme members. Sections 1.4  considers the role of 
costs in future pension reform. Finally Section 1.5 sets out the papers’ conclusions.  
 
1.2 Data Sources. 
 
Currently approximately 50 per cent of Irelands working population have voluntary 
pension arrangements in place. 
 
For individuals who are employees, the vast majority of voluntary pension arrangements 
are either defined benefit (DB) or defined contribution (DC) schemes. A DB scheme is 
one where the pension on retirement is fixed in advance usually as a proportion of the 
member’s salary in their last year of service or based on an average of their annual 
earnings for the last three years of service. Contribution levels are set at a level which is 
actuarially estimated to deliver the promised benefit on retirement.  A DC scheme 
“defines” the contribution to be made by the employee and the employer rather than the 
benefit promised on retirement. The retirement benefits for each member depend on the 
value of the annuity that the member’s “accumulated fund” at his/her retirement date 
can purchase and so it is not possible to know in advance what pension benefits the 
member will receive.  
 
The Irish Association of Pension Funds (IAPF) is a non- profit, non- commercial 
organisation which represents the interests of Irish pension funds. For the purposes of 
this research, all pension schemes registered with the IAPF for 2003 (there were 352 
schemes included on the IAPF 2003 register), were circulated, with a request for copies 
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of the schemes financial statements for the financial years ending 2002 to 2007 
inclusive. As a result of this circulation process and enquiries (not all pension schemes 
are registered with the IAPF) financial data was obtained from 58 Irish pension schemes 
although as discussed below, there was varying amounts of data for each scheme.  
 
A profile of the respondents across scheme type, number of members and total scheme 
assets is set out in Table 1.1 and the potential total population as reported by the Irish 
pensions regulatory body (Pensions Board) is described in Table 1.2. All of the 
schemes included in this study had in excess of 100 members. The number of schemes 
included in the study (58) accordingly represents approximately 10 per cent of all 
pension schemes with in excess of 100 members. 
 
Table 1.1 
Profile of Respondents in Study: 
 Defined Benefit Defined Contribution Total 
No. of schemes 43 15 58 
No. of members at end 2007 (active 
and deferred) 
371,653 3,138 374,791 
Assets under management at end 
2007 
€21.09bn. €0.04bn €21.13bn 
 
Table 1.2 
Total Population of Pension Schemes at end 2007, as reported by the Pension Board 
Annual Report 2007. 
 
 Defined Benefit Defined Contribution Total 
No. of schemes  1,319 of which 972 have 
less than 100 members 
98,483 of which 98,256 
have less than 100 
members 
99,802 of which 574 have 
in excess of 100 members 
No. of members at end 
2007 
530,933 269,465 800,398 
Assets under 
management at end 2007 
Approx. €65.9bn. Approx.€20.7bn €86.6bn. 
Pensions Board (2008)  
 
The schemes which provided data for the purpose of this study had an asset value of 
approximately €21.13bn or 24.4 per cent of total Irish pension fund assets at the end of 
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2007. The schemes account for approximately 375,000 members in total, some of 
which are described as active and some of which are described as deferred (Table 1.1). 
 
A data base was compiled for the years 2002 to 2007 of the information provided on the 
key income and expenditure amounts disclosed by each of the schemes, the total 
assets of each scheme at the beginning and end of each period and any additional 
information disclosed in relation to scheme costs. The data is both cross sectional and 
time series. Each pension scheme annual report is treated as one observation. 
However there are variable amounts of data for each pension scheme. While all 
schemes showed the net increase or decrease in the fund size over the year in question 
and net inflows and outflows for the year, there was no uniformity across schemes in 
the levels of further detail given. Some schemes provided only summary information to 
members and included a statement that details could be obtained directly from the 
scheme trustees.  
 
1.3 The Visibility and Impact of Costs. 
 
A widely referred to analysis of pension schemes in Ireland (Pensions Board (2006) 
Appendix A - The Life Strategies/ESRI report) made reference to assumptions on 
average annual fund costs incurred by Irish occupational pension schemes. While the 
findings underpinning these assumptions were largely based on UK sources (James 
(2000), and other UK data sources), they are accepted by the industry in Ireland as 
being indicative of the Irish experience. In summary the Life Strategies/ ESRI report 
(2006) makes the following assumptions on average annual explicit and implicit costs 
incurred by Irish occupational pension schemes; 
 
 Implicit trading costs of 0.65 per cent for equities, 0.25 per cent for corporate 
bonds and 0.1 per cent for Government and index- linked bonds.  
 Explicit costs of selling, processing and administering pension products and 
explicit charges paid to fund managers, equivalent in total, to a reduction in yield 
(RIY) of 1.5 per cent.  
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 Once - off expenses incurred in purchasing annuities for retiring members of 3 
per cent of the members fund prior to annuitisation, reflecting typical annuity 
commission rates of 2 per cent plus an assumed profit margin of 1 per cent.  
 
The average equity holding by Irish pension schemes was, close to 70 per cent (IAPF 
2002-2008 ) during the period under review, so that trading costs incurred by most 
schemes were closer to 0.65 per cent of fund value (i.e. the trading cost for equities) 
rather than 0.25 per cent or 0.1 per cent, Combining this trading cost of 0.65 per cent of 
fund value with a fund management charge of 1.5 per cent and adding in some 
additional cost for purchasing annuities (currently, only a minority (35 per cent) of 
pensions in payment are annuitised), an average annual fund cost level of 2.2 per cent 
of fund value was calculated and used for the purposes of this research as representing 
actual average scheme experience. 
  
Figure 1.1 below shows actual cost levels disclosed and reported in the financial 
statements of the schemes examined for the purposes of this research and compares 
them with an assumed average annual fund cost levels of 2.2 per cent of fund value.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. 
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Note; Due to the skewed distribution the median figure for 2001, 2003, 2006 and 2007 is too close to 0 to register a reading 
on the graph. 
 
The contrast depicted in Figure 1.1 is startling. If we assume that these schemes are 
experiencing actual costs close to the Life strategy/ESRI assumed average, the degree 
of non- disclosure makes what is disclosed meaningless and misleading in terms of 
providing members and trustees alike with an accurate picture of actual costs incurred. 
In effect, if we accept the Life Strategies/ESRI assumed Irish cost levels as being 
reliable then mandatory full cost disclosure by pension schemes would be likely to result 
in an increase well in excess of 100 per cent in costs currently disclosed. The median 
figure for 2001, 2003, 2006 and 2007 is too close to 0 to register a reading on the graph 
and for the remaining years is also relatively very low. This reflects the fact that a high 
percentage of schemes disclosed no fees at all.  
 
It is not assumed in this paper that costs are not being fully accounted for by pension 
schemes currently but rather that a significant portion of costs incurred are netted off 
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against investment income in scheme financial statements rather than shown 
separately. Hence if returns were reported gross of costs with costs disclosed 
separately, the reported numbers for each would be higher. 
 
The scheme financial statements examined, were categorised by industry type - 
Services (other than financial services), Retail, Manufacturing, and Financial Services to 
assess whether disclosure rates varied across industries.  Significant non disclosure 
featured across all industry types and for all years under review. 
 
As demonstrated by figure 1.2, there was a negative relationship between the size of 
the pension scheme and the rate of costs disclosed – i.e. the greater the size of the 
scheme (over a certain minimum fund level) the lower the rate of disclosed costs (the 
straight line indicating overall a downward trend as size increases).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 
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Note: The log of fund size was used because of the disparity in fund size 
 
This inverse relationship between size and rate of costs disclosed is not entirely 
surprising as it is likely that while larger firms incur larger absolute costs, their cost ratio 
(i.e. costs as a per cent of fund size) would be smaller due to economies of scale.  
 
Table 1.3 below summarises in column 2, the mean and median comparative results 
over time (2002-2007) for levels of costs disclosed in each of the categories as follows; 
– 
 
1. Schemes  with and schemes without a professional trustee,  
2. DB schemes compared with DC schemes,  
3. Schemes where the sponsoring parent is a publicly quoted company and 
schemes where the sponsoring parent company is not publicly quoted,  
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4. Schemes with a sponsoring parent in the financial services sector and schemes 
where neither the sponsoring company or a related company was a financial 
services company. 
5. Disclosure rates across the industry sectors, - financial services, services other 
than financial services, manufacturing, and retail.  
 
 
Table 1.3 
                                 Fees disclosed as a percentage of fund size 
                                   Summary Statistics 
 
Column    1 Column     2 Column    3 
 Summary Statistics Significance Tests 
 Mean Median Mean (t-test) Median (Z-
test) 
Professional Trustee 0.217 0.000 0.81 1.15 
Non-Professional Trustee 0.310 0.014   
     
Defined Contribution 0.000 0.000 5.58*** 5.65*** 
Defined Benefit 0.345 0.035   
     
Public Company 0.215 0.000 1.09 0.07 
Private Company 0.307 0.000   
     
Parent (Financial) 0.144 0.000 1.94** 0.067 
Parent (Non-Financial) 0.308 0.006   
     
Manufacturing 0.177 0.000   
Services 0.484 0.187   
Financial Services 0.144 0.000   
Retail 0.172 0.201   
Manufacturing vs. Services   2.46** 2.24** 
Manufacturing vs. Financial 
Services 
  0.40 0.33 
Manufacturing vs. Retail   0.04 1.54 
Services vs. Financial Services   1.66* 1.49 
Services vs. Retail   0.91 0.20 
Financial Services vs. Retail   0.27 1.44 
     
Note: This table reports the mean and median “fees disclosed as a percentage of fund size” for each of the categories of 
fund set out in Column 1 and by industry type. In column 3, the t and z-stats test the equality of means/medians, 
respectively between the two groups where ***, **, and * represents significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, 
respectively. 
 
In column 3 of Table 1.3 (above) the t and z –statistics test for each of the categories 
examined, whether the mean/median differences are statistically different from one 
another. The summary statistics and significance test results reported in Table 1.3 
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suggest that fund type, i.e. whether the scheme is a DB scheme or a DC scheme is a 
significant determining factor in the level of costs disclosed (significance level in excess 
of 2 – t-test 5.58, z -test 5.65). The results also suggest that differences in cost levels 
disclosed between a scheme with a sponsoring parent in the financial services sector 
and a scheme with a non financial services parent are also statistically significant, (t-
test 1.94). Finally, Table1.3 also indicates that the increased levels of costs disclosed 
by schemes in the services industry (other than financial services) are statistically 
significant, compared with the manufacturing industry (t-test 2.46, z-test 2.24), or the 
financial services industry (t -test 1.66, z-test 1.49). 
 
.  
The univariate comparisons summarised in Table 1.3 do not take cognizance of the fact 
that more than one factor may be influencing the results. For example, relative to DC 
schemes, DB schemes report a significantly higher level of costs (as a function of size), 
and relative to the manufacturing industry, schemes of companies in the services sector 
(other than the financial services sector) also report greater levels of costs. However it 
may be that the majority of schemes within the services sector are also DB schemes so 
that more than one variable may be affecting the result. The multiple pooled regression 
analysis presented in Table 1.4 tests the strength of the principal correlation  findings 
when other known factors are controlled for. 
 
The results in Table 1.4, however fall short of establishing causation, because it must 
be accepted that there may be other factors, not controlled for, which may be driving the 
relationship. To test for multicollinearity, variance inflation factors (VIF’s) were 
calculated. The VIF is a measure of how much the variance of an estimated regression 
coefficient is increased because of collinearity. The VIF results were less than 3 for 
each calculation, i.e. significantly below the cut-off value of 10 proposed by Kutner, 
Nachtsheim and Neter (2004) in terms of an acceptable level of multicollinearity. 
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Table 1.4 
Regression Estimates 
.      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Size of Pension Fund 
 
-0.045** 
[1.98] 
-0.043* 
[1.87] 
-0.061*** 
[2.67] 
-0.062*** 
[2.70] 
-0.062*** 
[2.64] 
-0.087*** 
[3.64] 
Professional Trustee 
 
 -0.067 
[0.57] 
-0.164 
[1.40] 
-0.167 
[1.38] 
-0.151 
[1.12] 
-0.221* 
[1.66] 
Defined Benefit 
 
  0.487*** 
[3.36] 
0.490*** 
[3.36] 
0.487*** 
[3.31] 
0.469*** 
[3.30] 
Public Company 
 
   0.015 
[0.13] 
0.047 
[0.28] 
0.148 
[0.88] 
Parent (Financial) 
 
    -0.062 
[0.27] 
 
Services 
 
     0.431*** 
[3.59] 
Financial Services 
 
     0.118 
[0.52] 
Retail 
 
     0.091 
[0.38] 
Time Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
       
R-Squared 0.035 0.037 0.105 0.106 0.106 0.180 
Note: This table reports coefficient estimates from pooled ordinary least squares regressions, with t-statistics (absolute 
value calculated using standard errors adjusted for clustering at the fund level) reported underneath in square brackets.  
The dependent variable is fees (disclosed) as a percentage of fund size. Size of Pension Fund is the log of the size of the 
pension fund (in euros) (The log is used to take account of the disparity in fund size). 
 Professional Trustee, Defined Benefit, Public Company, and Parent (Financial) are dummy variables which are 1 if the 
pension fund has a professional trustee, is a defined benefit, is a public company, and whose parent is a financial services 
company, respectively.  
 Services, Financial Services, and Retail are industry variables, where manufacturing is the excluded (and thus reference) 
industry class.  
 The coefficients were bootstrapped to take account of sample size. Bootstrapping provides a way to account for the 
distortions caused by a specific sample which may not be representative of the population 
 
The multiple pooled regression analysis in Table 1.4 above demonstrate that when 
certain other known factors are controlled for, there remains a significant negative 
correlation between fund size and the levels of costs disclosed. This is most likely 
explained by economies of scale. DB schemes disclose higher cost levels than DC 
schemes. Disclosure rates reported by the services industry other than the financial 
services industry remain significantly higher relative to the manufacturing industry. The 
reduction in levels of costs disclosed by schemes using the services of a professional 
trustee is found to be significant at the wider confidence levels only.  
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The inconsistencies in the level of disclosure of costs across schemes and overall low 
levels of disclosure of costs can be attributed to both the complexity of charging 
structures as set out earlier as well as a lack of any statutory requirement with regard to 
specific disclosures on total costs as one number to be included in the financial 
statements of pension funds.  
 
Table 1.5 replicates in column 1 the reported Income and Expenditure account of one of 
the schemes surveyed – (to be known as Scheme A), for the year 2002. The Income 
and Expenditure Account as presented would lead an uninformed reader to understand 
that total fees and costs incurred for the year was in fact €501,000 and that -
€66,031,000 represents losses made on investments before costs are taken into 
account. However if it is assumed that the scheme actually incurred costs 
approximating 2.2 per cent of the scheme value at the beginning of the year (the Life 
Strategies/ESRI assumed actual cost level), then the scheme costs were in fact 
€6,352,000 ( 2.2 per cent of €288,709,000 – Col 1, line 32), suggesting that undisclosed 
costs amount to €5,851,000 (line 38). This would suggest that gross investment losses 
for the year before costs were € 60,180,000 and that this loss position were 
exacerbated by costs and fees of €6,352,000. 
  
Column 2 of Table 1.5 restates the income and expenditure accounts of the Scheme A 
for 2002 on a full cost disclosure basis, assuming average fund cost levels of 2.2 per 
cent (based on the Life Strategies/ESRI report). Investment return is restated on a gross 
basis with a separate distinct disclosure of costs incurred. While the “bottom line” result 
remains unchanged ( i.e. the fund value at the end of the year is stated at €217,019,000 
in both columns 1 and 2 – line 34), the body of the income and expenditure account is 
significantly more informative in terms of the absolute amount of costs incurred and the 
resultant impact on gross income earned. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 15 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.5 
Income and Expenditure Account of Scheme A for the year ended 31 December 2002 
 Col. 1 Col 2 Line 
Contributions and benefits (000’s) (000’s) 1 
Company contributions: Normal 2778 2778 2 
Members contributions: Normal 2008 2008 3 
Transfers from AVC scheme 21 21 4 
Transfers from other funds 210 210 5 
 5017 5017 6 
   7 
Pensions 6086 6086 8 
Commutations 2615 2615 9 
Death in service benefits 218 218 10 
Refund to members leaving service 234 234 11 
Transfers to other funds 534 534 12 
Insurance premium 26 26 13 
   14 
Net deductions from dealing with members -5088 -5088 15 
   16 
Return on Investments   17 
Investment income  5592  18 
Foreign exchange losses -61  19 
Overseas tax  51  20 
(Loss)/profit on sale of investments* -24076  21 
Unrealised losses on investments** -47537  22 
Investment manager and custodial fees -501  23 
Net return on investments -66532 -60180 24 
   25 
   26 
Total costs and fees  -6352 27 
   28 
Net decrease in fund during period. -71620 -71620 29 
   30 
Net assets of the scheme:   31 
At beginning of period 288709 288709 32 
   33 
At end of period 217089 217089 34 
   35 
Costs as disclosed: 501  36 
Total costs  6,352 37 
Costs not disclosed 5,851  38 
 
 
As provided to          
Scheme members 
2002 
Restated to 
            show costs                 
of 2.2 per cent 
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Figure 1.3 shows the RIY impact on fund values over a 5, 10, 15 and 20 year period, of 
an annual cost level of 2.2 per cent on a fund with a starting value of €20m, annual net 
contributions of €100,000 and an assumed average annual gross rate of return of 4.5 
per cent.  The RIY is determined by comparing the future fund value assuming no costs 
with the future fund value assuming annual costs of 2.2 per cent to bring the net rate of 
return down to 2.3 per cent.  
 
 
Figure 1.3 
 
 
The compound effect of costs over the lifetime of a fund can be considerable as shown 
by Figure 1.3 (in excess of €15m or 33 percent of the gross fund, based on the data in 
Figure 1.3.  
 
 
RIY impact on fund values of annual costs of 2.20% on gross yield of 4.50%  
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1.4 Costs – An issue or not in dealing with pension provision into 
the future? 
 
 
The UK Pensions Commission (2005) recommended as part of a package of reform 
measures, the provision of a low cost pension provision option, which would in the 
longer term achieve annual management charges of as low as 0.3 per cent. Reductions 
in annual management charges from rates approximating 2.2 per cent of fund value 
down to rates as low as 0.3 per cent of fund value would (if they could be achieved) 
result in significant savings over the lifetime of a fund.  
The RIY impact and effect on fund value of a reduction in costs from 2.2 per cent (Life 
Strategies/ESRI assumed average) to 0.3 per cent, on a fund with a starting value of 
€20,000,000, annual net contributions of €100,000 and a gross rate of return of 4.5 per 
cent is depicted in Figures 1.4 and 1.5 below. 
 
Figure 1.4 
 
 
 
 
R.I.Y Impact on Future Values - 2.20% versus 0.30% Annual Costs – Starting Fund €20m. 
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Figure 1.5 
 
1.5 Conclusion 
 
The RIY impact of pension fund costs (administrative and all other charges) over the 
lifetime of a scheme highlights the need for greater focus to be placed on cost 
efficiencies and competitiveness in any proposals for pension reform in Ireland. The 
lack of full consistent disclosure in fund financial statements, potentially contributes to 
an overall lack of emphasis on costs and hampers meaningful analysis and comparison. 
An immediate measure to require uniform full disclosure of total costs as one number in 
financial statements would help focus attention on costs levels and potentially introduce 
cost competitiveness. Even a small percentage reduction in costs per annum can have 
a significant impact over the lifetime of a fund. 
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